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as it is well known that in most instances in recent years the legal rate
has not been realized on funds, and the plaintiff's damages probably did
not amount to more than the two per cent allowed. Also as the defendant
acted in good faith and had apparent grounds for the refusal of the
plaintiff's demand for payment, the bank, its depositors and creditors
should not be penalized by having to pay the legal rate of interest as
damages.
C. M. IVEY, JR.
Constitutional Law-Bankruptcy-Municipal Corporations.
Congress in 1934, by the Sumners-Wilcox Municipal Debt Re-
adjustment Act,1 amended the Federal Bankruptcy Act2 to permit
any municipality or other political subdivision of any state to obtain
a voluntary readjustment of its debts through proceedings in the Fed-
eral courts. A Texas water improvement district, claiming to be in-
solvent and unable to meet its debts as they matured, petitioned the
United States District Court for a readjustment under the Sumners
Act.3 The Texas legislature in the meantime granted political sub-
divisions the express right to proceed under the Federal law.4 The
United States Supreme Court held the act invalid as an unconstitu-
tional encroachment upon state sovereignty over the fiscal affairs of
local governmental units,5 regardless of the express consent of the state.
The majority of the court felt that as the power "to establish uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" and the power "to lay and
collect taxes" were both granted in Article I, section 8 of the Constitu-
Lowden v. Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 10 F. Supp. 430 (S. D.
Iowa 1935) ; Coral Gables Inc. v. Patterson, 166 So. 40 (Ala. 1936) ; Reif v. Bar-
rett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E. 889 (1933); Chicago' Title and Trust Co. v. Chicago
Trust Co., 1 N. E. (2d) 87 (Ill. 1936); Bolivar Tp. Board of Finance of Benton
County v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158 (1934) ; United Shoe Stores Co.
v. Burt, 142 So. 370 (La. 1932); Campbell v. City of Boston, 195 N. E. 802
(Mass. 1935) ; Shonnard v. Elevator Supplies Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 94, 161 Atl. 684
(1932); Williams v. Williams, 12 N. J. Misc. 641, 174 Atl. 423 (1934); Kuhn
v. Cermac Realty Co., 148 Misc. 324, 265 N. Y4 Supp. 861 (1933); In re .Con-
nelly's Estate, 151 Misc. 310, 271 N. Y. Supp. 368 (1934); State ex rel. Zim-
merman v. Gibbes, 171 S. C. 209, 172 S. E. 130 (1933); Dukes v. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co., 172 S. C. 502, 174 S. E. 463 (1934).
148 Stat. 798, 11 U. S. C. A. §§301, 303 (1934).
230 Stat. 554 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq. (1927).
381 re Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103 (D. C.
Tex. 1934) (petition denied for lack of jurisdiction). Contra: Cameron County
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Ashton, 81 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ;
In re East Contra Costa Irrigation Dist., 10 F. Supp. 175 (D. C. Cal. 1935) ;
In re Imperial Irrigation Dist., 10 F. Supp. 832 (D. C. Cal. 1935), Note (1936)
34 Mice. L. REv. 731; see Carteret County v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of
the World, 78 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
'TEx. LAws (1935) c. 107.
Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 892,
80 L. ed. adv. op. 910 (1936) (5-4 decision).
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ion, they should be limited equally. Therefore, since the Federal Gov-
ernment cannot tax the states,6 neither can it interfere with a state's
sovereignty by the exercise of the bankruptcy power.
The court's viewpoint of an infringement on states' rights seems
untenable. The Act specifically provides against any interference with
states' rights7 because: (1) the governmental units may not act except
by a voluntary petition ;8 (2) this petition must have the written ap-
proval of the state agency if one has been created to handle municipal
insolvency problems ;9 (3) the Federal judge must approve the plan of
readjustment. 10 This element of consent would seem to remove the ob-
jection of interference with states' rights since either government may
tax the other if consent is given,"- and a state may even interfere with
interstate or foreign commerce with consent of the Federal govern-
ment. 1 2 Therefore if consent will validate a taxation burden there should
be no objection to a beneficial debt readjustment privilege. 13 Fear of
a future extension so as to amount to an encroachment is completely
obliterated by judicial review of the Supreme Court.
1 4
It was thought that the Act would be attacked upon the ground that
municipalities are not the proper subject of bankruptcy, 15 there being
no distributable assets, as property used for governmental purposes is
not subject to attachment and private property of citizens may be
reached only by taxation. However, distributable assets have been
deemed unnecessary in the past,' 6 and recent opinions appear to sup-
port this view.17 Nor is the Act hostile to the nature of bankruptcy
8 Collector v. Day, 78 U. S. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1870) ; cf. McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819) (states cannot tax instrumentalities of Fed-
eral Gov't).
748 Stat. 798 §80(k), 11 U. S. C. A. §303(k) (1934).
848 Stat. 798 §80(a), 11 U. S. C. A. §303(a) (1934).
'48 Stat. 798 §80(k), 11 U. S. C. A. §303(k) (1934).
1048 Stat. 798 §80(a), 11 U. S. C. A. §303(a) (1934).
Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 545, 56 Sup. Ct. 417,
80 L. ed. 588 (1936) ; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 56 Sup. Ct. 421,
80 L. ed. 367 (1936).
'Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. ed. 572 (1891)
James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., 242 U. S. 311,
37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917) ; Whitfield v. Ohio, 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 80 L. ed.
527 (1936).
n (1935) 83 U~xv. OF PA. L. REv. 920.
" (1936) 34 MICH. L. REv. 1252, 1254.
'The Court assumed "for this discussion that the enactment is adequately
related to the general subject of bankruptcies." But see Briggs, Shall Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction be Extended to Include Municipalities and Other Taxable Sub-
divisions? (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 637; GLENN, LiQUIDATION (1934) §419.
10 See Vulcan Sheet Metal Co. v. North Platte Valley Irrigation Co., 220 Fed.
106, 108 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
' See: In re Bradford, 7 F., Supp. 665 (D. Md. 1934) ; In re Radford, 8 F.
Supp. 489 (W. D. Ky. 1934), res/d by Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 Sup. Ct. 854, 79 L. ed. 1593 (1935), but on grounds of
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by providing for a composition agreement' 8 because composition was
specifically granted by the bankruptcy act of 1867 and is available in
our existing statute.' 9 Therefore it would appear that the exclusion
of municipalities in past bankruptcy legislation has been for reasons
other than any inherent disability of the municipality.2 0 As Mr. Justice
Cardozo explains in his vigorous dissent, the concept of the field to be
included within the term "Bankruptcy" has been a growing one, and
"the act for the relief of local governmental units is a stage in an evolu-
tionary process which is likely to be misconceived unless regarded as a
whole."
21
The situation which gave rise to the passage of the Sumners Act
was and still is a serious one. Commencing with the collapse of the
Florida "boom" in 1926 there has been an ever increasing number of
municipal defaults in recent years. There were approximately 2,600
taxing districts, in 41 states, in default on November 1, 1934. Their ag-
gregate defaults represented about 10 per cent of the total indebted-
ness of states and their local units.22 The result was that local taxing
agents were being subjected to continuous mandamus actions to com-
pel them to tax and tax again to pay off creditors. This in turn was
having a detrimental effect upon the credit of solvent taxing agents.
Numerous schemes of voluntary refunding were devised and tried by
the local governments with varying degrees of success. Also many states
passed special legislation in an attempt to effectuate an adequate rem-
edy. None were very successful because the Constitution expressly
prohibits the States from passing any law impairing existing contracts.
Federal action under the express constitutional power to enact bank-
ruptcy legislation was necessary to avoid this constitutional restriction.
There was little hope of a composition by consent of creditors as a mi-
violation of due process clause of U. S. Constitution. Insolvency is not a neces-
sary factor for bankruptcy jurisdiction. In re Foster Paint and Varnish Co.,
210 Fed. 652 (E. D. Pa. 1914) ; George M. West Co. v. Lea Brothers and Co., 174
U. S. 590, 19 Sup. Ct. 836, 43 L. ed. 1098 (1899).
"Iln re Reiman, Fed. Cas. No. "11, 673 (D. C. N. Y. 1874) ; aff(d. N01 111,675
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875).
"30 Stat. 554 (1898), 11 U. S. C A. §§30, 32 (c.) (1927).
'In re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ; 7 REmINGTON, BANK-
RUPTcY (4th ed. 1935) §§3155.19, 3155.01.
'Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 892,
898, 80 L. ed. adv. op. 910, 916, 917 (1936). For a history of the bankruptcy
clause see: WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN THM UNITED STATES (1935) 9; (1932) 17
MARQ. L. REV. 163; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555,
587, 588, 55 Sup. Ct. 854, 862, 79 L. ed. 1593,.1603, 1604 (1934) ; Continental Ill.
National Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, 294
U. S. 648, 667, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 602, 79 L. ed. 1110, 1123 (1935).
118 PuB. MANAG. 178 (1936); 24 NAT. Mum REv. 32,335 (1935); Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 186 and H. R.
5950, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934) 12.
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nority group of bondholders would invariably refuse to accept a new
arrangement. The Sunmers Act remedied this by making recalcitrant
holders accede to the plans of the majority.
Undoubtedly, governmental units actually petitioning the courts un-
der the Municipal Debt Readjustment Act would, because of the publicity
gained thereby, have their immediate future credit injured. But in the
majority of cases the Act would not have to be used. The greatest
value of the Act was that its presence would serve as a "persuasive
influence" with which to threaten minority bondholders into agree-
ment, thus making actual court action a last resort in extreme cases.23
Since the Court has denied a petition to rehear,24 a solution to the
problem must be found through legislative action by the respective
states. A few have enacted measures to deal with the problem. A sum-
mary of the action taken by the various states is given in "Legislation
and Municipal Debt" in the American Bar Association Journal.25
New Jersey26 authorized readjustment procedure through the state
supreme court. On a petition of the bondholders to the court stating
that the municipality has defaulted, a Justice, if satisfied as to the de-
fault, may file an order to that effect, after which the municipality may
seek the aid of the Municipal Finance Commission in refunding. The
Commission then takes charge of the finances of the municipality until
the indebtedness is within all statutory limits.
Oregon2 7 also provides for control over defaulting municipalities
-by court action. Holders of defaulted obligations may petition the
county court, which, with the consent of the municipality, appoints an
administrator who takes over the financial affairs of the local unit. Re-
funding or liquidating plans must be approved by the court.
In Connecticut 28 when a municipality defaults on relief bonds, the
State Emergency Relief Commission may apply to the superior court
for the appointment of a receiver to have complete control of the finan-
cial affairs of the municipality.
Massachusetts,2 9 on three occasions, has passed statutes which placed
the finances of three defaulting municipalities in separate state com-
missions, the members of which were appointed by the Governor.
I For a report of the action taken under the Sumners-Wilcox Act through-
out the United States see: 25 NAT. MUN. REv. 328 (1936).
" Ten states through their respective Attorneys General filed a brief as amici
curiae in support of a petition for a rehearing by the Supreme Court. 4 U. S.
Law Week 1 (1936). Petition for rehearing denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 5 (1936).
21 A. B. A. J. 370 (1935) ; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed.
197 (1880) (action taken by Tennessee in 1877).
IN. 3. LAWS (1931) c. 340, S. B. §365.
'ORE. LAws (1933) c. 433, p. 1.
'CONN. GEN. STATS. (Supp. 1933) c. 32a, part II.
'MASS. ACTS 1931 c. 44; AcTs 1932 c. 223; ACTs 1933 c. 341.
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Virginia3" has a harsh law for defaulting counties. It allows the Gov-
ernor, upon petition by the bondholders, to order the state comp-
troller to withhold payments to the county of state funds (except school
funds) until the default is overcome.
Montana31 provides for refunding if the refunding plan is approved
by the state examiner.
The default problem in North Carolina3 2 has been handled through
the Local Government Commission which advises and aids local units
in drafting refunding plans.
If neither Federal nor State action alone can solve this problem
adequately, it has been suggested that a desirable result might be reached
by making their legislation complementary. Through the "full faith
and credit" clause "Congress might exercise its bankruptcy power by an
act which would recognize the validity of state adjudications and state
discharges wherever the jurisdiction of Congress extends."33
All of the above legislation has been an attempt to remedy the evil
after it has come into existence. The state legislatures should prevent
the formation of this evil in the future by enacting strict measures
which would prevent local governmental units from burdening them-
selves during "boom" periods with excessive and unnecessary bonded
indebtedness. W. C. HOLT.
Constitutional Law-Minimum Wage Legislation.
The United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision1 recently de-
clared unconstitutional a New York minimum wage statute2 for women.
The Court based its conclusion entirely upon the case of Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital,3 which banned an attempt of Congress to regulate wages
for women in the District of Columbia as an "unconstitutional inter-
ference with the freedom of contract included within the guaranties of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."
IVA. LAWS (1932) c. 148.
MoNT. LAws (EXTRA SEssioN 1933) c. 6.
In North Carolina over 250 local units have defaulted in the last siZ years.
(1936). 25 NAT. MUN. REv. 323. There are at present 24 counties and 98 cities and
towns in default, 3 Pop. GOV'T 16 (1936).
(1935) 22 VA. LAW REv. 39; (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 702 (discussing comity by
the Federal Courts to state statutory receiverships of defaulting municipalities).
'Morehead v. People of New York, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. ed. Adv. op. 921
(1936).
2 N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill's, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935) c. 32, §§550-567. Statute
set up a wage board to conduct investigations concerning wage payment and to
determine minimum wages in certain industries upon proof that the employee
was being paid an "oppressive wage." An oppressive wage was defined as one
"less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than
sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health." Violation
of this act was punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both.2261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785 (1922).
